Abstract Banking and borrowing emission allowances provide temporal flexibility in cap-andtrade systems, which can enhance the economic efficiency of environmental policy while adhering to the same cumulative emission budget. This paper investigates the role of temporal (Bwhen^) flexibility from emission banking provisions under an economy-wide cap-and-trade policy in the USA. The current literature on meeting deep decarbonization targets almost exclusively assumes unlimited banking, which may bias policy recommendations and have important consequences for R&D prioritization and model development. Numerical experiments using the energy-economic model US Regional Energy, GHG, and Economy (US-REGEN) indicate that assumptions about banking materially impact cost and emission pathways in meeting long-term targets like 80% reductions by 2050 relative to 2005 levels. Given the stringency of long-run targets and convexity of marginal abatement costs, the cost-minimizing time path for mitigation with banking suggests that 2025 abatement should exceed the pledged level under the Paris Agreement (42% instead of 26-28%) to reduce future costs. Total policy costs are approximately 30% higher when banking is excluded; however, political economy barriers and uncertainty may limit the use of banking provisions despite their appeal on economic efficiency grounds. Banking on policy implementation with unlimited temporal flexibility may distort insights about the pace, extent, and economic impacts of future energy transitions associated with long-term abatement targets, especially for more stringent climate policies.
Contribution (NDC) and Climate Action Plan, respectively. Evaluating the economic and environmental impacts of policies to reach these targets is important for policy-makers, investors, and other stakeholders. Modelers often use market-based environmental policies (e.g., cap-and-trade systems covering all sectors and all GHGs) as benchmarks for these assessments. Not only can such modeling provide insight into the extent of sectoral transformations and relative contributions, but such efforts can quantify whether policy proposals are maximizing efficiency. Market-based approaches typically equate marginal abatement costs across sectors and provide many margins for flexible compliance, which in principle achieves targets with lower welfare impacts than command-and-control approaches.
A critical assumption in modeling market-based policies is the degree to which temporal flexibility (often called Bwhen^flexibility) can be used as a cost-containment mechanism. Temporal flexibility allows aggregate pollution targets to be met by varying the time path of mitigation, which can incentivize cost-effective reductions without compromising environmental efficacy. This flexibility can shift compliance obligations by regulated entities either earlier (i.e., banking) or later (i.e., borrowing) in the time horizon to take advantage of perceived intertemporal arbitrage opportunities. In particular, banking is attractive when expectations of higher marginal abatement costs in the future outweigh discounting and capital stock effects, which encourage early effort when costs are comparably low.
1 Under deep decarbonization scenarios with credible and anticipated long-term targets, near-term overcompliance banks allowances for later use when marginal abatement costs may be significantly higher (e.g., Murray et al. 2009 ). Banking emission allowances is a feature of many older proposed cap policies for other pollutants and of some current regulations (see Table 1 in Supplementary Information Section 1.1); however, political economy barriers and uncertainty may limit the use of these provisions for GHGs.
The literature on the timing of emission reductions has largely used stylized models and suggests that optimal banking or borrowing strategies depend on context-specific features, as Supplementary Information Section 1.2 discusses in detail. For instance, Kling and Rubin (1997) show how emission trajectories and banking (or borrowing) behavior depend on the discount rate and curvature of the abatement cost function and consequently on the rate of technological change and sectoral output. More recent global integrated assessment modeling for achieving climate stabilization targets indicates that more substantial near-term reductions are desirable when targets are more stringent and when carbon capture technologies are limited (Krey et al. 2014) . Ultimately, these studies suggest that more detailed modeling is required to determine the value of flexibility and possible mitigation trajectories (i.e., whether banking or borrowing is appropriate), with country-level specificity, provisions of proposed policies, and detailed sectoral representations (especially of the energy system).
There is a limited but growing body of literature that specifically addresses the technical and economic details of meeting proposed US climate policy goals. However, these studies almost exclusively assume unlimited banking and borrowing to reach these so-called B80-by50^targets Kyle et al. 2009; Paltsev et al. 2009 ). The two largest studies to investigate policies consistent with these targets are the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 22 and 24 intermodel comparison exercises published in 2009 and 2014. All scenarios in these two studies assume unlimited temporal flexibility (and employ significant levels of banking, as discussed in Sect. 4) and do not conduct sensitivity analyses to evaluate the effects of restricted banking. Since first-best policy implementation with unlimited temporal flexibility is not assured for a variety of political and institutional reasons, 2 it is important to understand the economic and environmental implications of limited temporal flexibility. The analysis in this paper contributes to this literature by conducting sensitivities with and without temporal flexibility (since the former is almost exclusively assumed) using a technologically and regionally detailed energy-economic model of the USA.
An additional motivation is to understand how alternate assumptions about temporal flexibility under cap-and-trade systems can inform the target setting for countries like the USA under the Paris Agreement. The Agreement's ratchet mechanism directs countries to successively update and communicate medium-term targets to reach long-term emission reduction goals, but the agreement does not currently allow for banking between subsequent NDCs. Given how the Paris agreement aims Bto reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible^and to use market instruments to Bpromote mitigation and adaptation ambition,^the cap-and-trade literature on permit banking can provide guidance on time pathways for emission reductions. Country-specific analyses like the one in subsequent sections offer rigorous frameworks for quantifying trade-offs between different transformation paths to reach the same cumulative emission budget.
This paper demonstrates how the magnitude and variation of 80-by-50 policy outcomes (i.e., 80% GHG reductions by 2050) are impacted by the assumption of full intertemporal flexibility in achieving emission reductions. The analysis uses the US Regional Energy, GHG, and Economy (US-REGEN) model, which features regional disaggregation and technological detail of the power sector with linkages to other economic sectors. As discussed in EPRI (2017) and the Supplementary Information Section 2, the electric sector module simultaneously captures capacity investment and dispatch decisions for all model regions. This electric sector representation iterates with a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the economy.
Model results suggest that policy costs are higher and 2050 emissions lower without banking, though the magnitudes of these impacts depend on the convexity of the marginal abatement cost curve. Although conclusions about temporal flexibility are robust to a range of technological sensitivity analyses, banking is not used for less stringent long-run targets. The analysis also highlights how existing economic model intercomparison studies of stringent US climate policies rely on high levels of temporal flexibility. Banking on first-best policy implementation may distort insights about the pace and extent of future energy transitions associated with long-term abatement targets and consequently the economic impacts of such policies. Since economic and emission outcomes depend on banking behavior, ambitious pathways may entail more long-run ambition than current assessments suggest.
Methods

US-REGEN model
The analysis uses the US Regional Economy, Greenhouse Gas, and Energy (US-REGEN) model, an energy-economic model that connects a detailed representation of electric-sector capacity investment, dispatch, and co-optimized transmission expansion with a dynamic CGE model of the economy (EPRI 2017) . The model assesses regional implications of multisector, multigas policies and can explore how different assumptions about the technological and policy-related landscapes may influence transformation pathways. Recent applications of US-REGEN investigate a range of power sector and energy questions (e.g., Bistline 2017; Young et al. 2016; Blanford et al. 2016; James et al. 2015; Blanford, et al. 2014) .
The electric sector module contains added detail to simultaneously capture multidecadal capacity investments through 2050 and hourly dispatch decisions for all 15 model regions in the contiguous USA. US-REGEN's intertemporal optimization formulation assumes perfect foresight, which means that the deterministic model does not hedge against technological or policy-based uncertainties (Bistline 2015) . This technologically detailed model iterates with a CGE model of the economy, which represents residential, commercial, industrial, transportation, and refining sectors. The convergence process between the two models is described in EPRI (2017) . The macroeconomic CGE model is formulated as a mixed-complementarity problem using MPSGE syntax and solved using the PATH solver in GAMS (Böhringer and Rutherford 2008) . The CGE model captures energy efficiency (i.e., end-use trade-offs between fuels and capital) through substitution elasticities. As described in EPRI (2017) and Section 2 of the Supplementary Information, the technological and sectoral detail in US-REGEN provide more nuanced trade-offs and margins of response to climate policy than more aggregate representations (e.g., marginal abatement cost curves) allow.
Scenario assumptions
The reference (i.e., no policy) scenario includes most existing and known future state and federal policies and regulations. Updated state renewable portfolio standards are included along with federal policies like MATS and CWA Section 316(b). Other state policies include California's AB 32 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) for eastern states. The Clean Air Act Sections 111(b) and 111(d) CO 2 performance standards are not included in the reference scenario. The 2015 tax extenders for wind and solar are also excluded.
No forced retirements for existing coal units are included in the reference, though retirements for economic reasons are possible. EPRI technological costs and limitations (e.g., on the rate and extent of transmission and nuclear deployment) are used. Note that removing nuclear investment constraints (ceteris paribus) would decrease compliance costs and that more pessimistic license renewal assumptions would increase costs. An important caveat is that US-REGEN assumes exogenous technological change. Given how banking behavior depends on factors like anticipated technological change, discounting, and required reductions from higher marginal abatement cost sectors, the omission of endogenous technological learning likely impacts results, though the direction and degree of impact are ambiguous. Note that exogenously specified technological changes, model constraints (e.g., on new transmission investments), and discounting suggest that abatement costs depend on abatement timing but not necessarily on the abatement rate.
Fuel prices and energy demand are based on the Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook. The natural gas price trajectory comes from the 2015 AEO reference case, which starts at $4.88/MMBtu (2013 dollars) in 2020 and escalates to $7.85 by 2040. Subsequent AEO releases suggest lower natural gas price trajectories, which would impact economic and emission outcomes in the reference and policy cases.
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The terrestrial land sink (shown in gray below the horizontal axis in Fig. 1 ) is treated exogenously according to Energy Modeling Forum 32 specifications for all scenarios, where the land sink decreases linearly over time between 1 GtCO 2 eq in 2025 to 0.5 in 2050.
For the economy-wide cap-and-trade policy variants, the 2025 and 2050 targets are 26 and 80% below 2005 levels, respectively. These goals are based on the US NDC pledge and Climate Action Plan. The 2009 Copenhagen pledge to reduce net GHG emissions by 17% by 2020 is also included. Net emission targets for interim years follow a linear trajectory. The 80% goal implies a net emission target of approximately 1.2 billion metric tons annually by 2050. As discussed in Sect. 3.2, actual emissions depend on banking and borrowing behavior when temporal flexibility is allowed. All gases and all sectors are assumed to participate in the cap-and-trade program. When banking and borrowing are available, temporal flexibility can shift the abatement trajectory while holding cumulative emissions constant (i.e., instead of assuming the cap goal is exactly met in each compliance period).
Note that the analysis includes both the ability to bank or borrow under runs with unlimited temporal flexibility. However, the importance of banking under stringent policies in the existing literature and this analysis make it the focus of discussion in the paper.
Results
The first subsection compares the reference (i.e., no climate policy) scenario with an economywide, all GHG cap-and-trade system without banking that achieves the 2025 NDC goal and then ramps down to the 80% target by 2050. The second subsection describes a scenario with the same targets but allows unlimited temporal flexibility through banking and borrowing allowances, which can shift the abatement trajectory while holding cumulative emissions constant. Figure 1 presents model results for emissions by GHG (left column) and sector (right column) with the reference and two 80% cap scenarios. Economy-wide emissions in the reference scenario (first row in Fig. 1 ) are predominantly CO 2 (dark blue, top) and come from the power sector and transportation (dark blue and gray, bottom).
80% cap without banking
Under an 80% cap, GHG emissions and their composition change dramatically (middle row of Fig. 1 ). The quickest transformation occurs in the electric power sector. Although CO 2 emissions have been trending downward recently (Feng et al. 2015) , reaching long-term goals requires an accelerated and sustained abatement trajectory. Emissions from electricity generation decrease 71% between 2010 and 2030, and the sector is decarbonized by 2040, in part to support emission reductions in other sectors through electrification. Fuel switching leads to electricity providing half of final energy by 2050. Sectors with higher marginal abatement costs delay reductions until targets tighten and use the remaining 2050 emission budget for domains with costly and challenging abatement (e.g., non-CO 2 GHGs, heavy-duty transportation, industry). The sectoral composition of the remaining emissions underscores how deep decarbonization is not only about energy but also about land use, agriculture, and other interconnected areas of the economy. Figure 2 shows how rapid and substantial the transformation is for the power sector. 4 By 2030, coal has largely been phased out of the portfolio, and generation comes mostly from renewables, natural gas, and nuclear. Although peak demand in 2050 is just under 1000 GW, total capacity exceeds 2000 GW, which reflects the low capacity value and capacity factors of wind and solar. The light-duty vehicle fleet also undergoes tremendous changes under stringent emission reduction targets, as evidenced in Fig. 3a . Early decades rely primarily on conventional internal combustion engine vehicles, but the rollout of hybrid-electric and batteryelectric vehicles after 2030 is rapid, even with model constraints on the adoption of new technologies. Overall, the US Climate Action Plan's targeted reductions by 2050 entail ambitious transformations across many sectors. Significant and sustained efforts would be required for research, development, and deployment to lower costs of existing technologies and to increase the availability of non-extant technologies later in the time horizon. Electrification is a key element of economy-wide reductions consistent with the 80-by-50 policy goal. 
Temporal flexibility under an 80% cap
As shown in Fig. 1c , f, banking creates a reserve of emission credits in early compliance periods by Bfront-loading^abatement, and emissions are above the cap as the bank is drawn down in later decades. The reliance on banking provisions when they are available is largely due to the steeply convex shape of marginal abatement costs. Banking is used to shift emissions not only across time but also across sectors, which underscores potential interactions between flexibility provisions.
Questions about the consistency between near-and long-term goals can be answered by examining whether temporal flexibility suggests exceeding (banking) or relaxing (borrowing) the near-term target. Model results indicate that the cost-minimizing 2025 emission level would be about 42% lower than 2005, which exceeds the ambition of the US NDC pledge (26-28%). Economy-wide emissions in 2020 are 1 billion metric tons lower than targeted levels. On the other hand, 2050 emissions are roughly twice as high as the targeted cap, which raises questions about the ability to reach goals beyond the specified horizon and implies questions about whether the extensive use of banking would be politically viable.
Examining the composition of banked emissions by sector (Fig. 4) demonstrates that banked emissions largely come from the power sector, which displace higher-marginal-cost reductions after 2040. A combination of low-cost natural gas and variable renewables, slow demand growth in many regions, and low utilization gas assets create comparatively low abatement costs in the power sector. In contrast, higher costs in other sectors like aviation and non-CO 2 GHGs in agriculture are driven by a more limited choice set of available technologies, significant cost heterogeneity, behavioral barriers to adoption, and market conditions Rose et al. 2013) . Note that the pace of reductions in economy-wide emission intensity is historically unprecedented for such extended time horizons across many scenarios (Loftus et al. 2014 ), but the pace of power sector mitigation is especially rapid under the banking scenarios. There are a few country-specific examples of rapid low-carbon deployment (Cao et al. 2016) , but the applicability of these cases remains to be seen and will likely be determined by a combination of policy decisions, technological options, and political economy constraints. Banking impacts the pace and extent of the transition for light-duty vehicles. If banking is available, long-term passenger vehicle electrification is less extensive (Fig. 3b) . Electric vehicle deployment in 2050 represents roughly half of all miles traveled with banking, so although the policy still requires a massive transformation relative to current levels, it is not as ambitious as when caps must be met exactly in each compliance period (i.e., without temporal flexibility). Supplementary Fig. 2 demonstrates how temporal flexibility can impact economic metrics. Allowance prices (i.e., shadow prices on the emission cap constraint) indicate that banking leads to price smoothing, starting at a higher initial price but suppressing 2050 prices. Values are three to six times higher without banking, depending on technological assumptions. Using a net-present-value metric for consumption loss, policy costs are roughly 30% higher when intertemporal arbitrage is excluded.
Results thus far have presented abatement pathways under stringent climate policy targets, assuming 80% reductions of all GHGs in all sectors by 2050. Figure 5 illustrates the economy-wide emission trajectories under less ambitious long-term targets both with and without banking. The degree of banking utilization depends on the stringency of this long-term target, as a 20% cap by 2050 leads to very little near-term banking but the 80% target front-loading abatement considerably. These experiments align with the economic literature discussed in Supplementary Section 1.2, which suggests that near-term decisions are shaped jointly by long-run ambitions and by policy provisions for flexibility. In particular, cap-and-trade programs with temporal flexibility encourage banking only when climate policies are stringent and abatement costs are sufficiently higher at these levels; otherwise, discounting effects dominate. Ultimately, the Climate Action Plan is costly to meet in US-REGEN due to its 2050 stringency (specifically due to higher marginal abatement costs for non-CO 2 GHGs, heavy-duty transportation, and industry), and given the comparatively low abatement costs in the electric sector, banking is valuable through early emission reductions in this sector.
The significance of banking provisions in altering compliance costs and abatement trajectories is robust across a range of technological scenarios, as discussed in Supplementary Information Section 3. A separate sensitivity constraining the terminal period emissions to the targeted cap level (i.e., 80% in 2050) that otherwise allows temporal flexibility leads to a similar emission trajectory as the full temporal flexibility case but with slightly less banking in early periods and higher compliance costs (total net present value of consumption loss through 2050 of $3.68 trillion instead of $3.49).
Discussion and conclusions
Historically, domestic climate policy recommendations-exemplified by the National Academies report on climate change (National Academies 2011)-and climate economic studies were aligned regarding the importance of banking and borrowing provisions in reaching long-term climate objectives. However, the formal US submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (US Department of State 2016) does not specifically mention the use of when flexibility to achieve its goals or to identify short-run targets to reach longer-run ones.
Since assumptions about banking provisions lead to important differences in economic and environmental outcomes of policies, it is critical to understand the many potential factors limiting the extensive use of temporal flexibility.
5 First, regulatory risk may limit the banking of emission credits, as uncertainty about long-term targets and credibility provide disincentives for early abatement (Bosetti and Victor 2011; Hasegawa and Salant 2015) . Additionally, observed levels of effort under current regulations as well as stated commitments are inconsistent with banking pathways. This climate pledge gap suggests that, unless new regulations are promulgated, deficits or borrowing could occur in early years (US Department of State 2016). Second, the magnitudes of intertemporal wealth transfers implied by banking may be limited by political-economy constraints. Likewise, permit banking volumes and financial flows across sectors and geographical areas may not be political feasible. Finally, as the analysis in the previous section indicated, higher emissions in later compliance periods call into question the ability to achieve objectives just beyond the finite policy horizon. These caveats underscore the importance of understanding and evaluating the economic and environmental implications of alternate pathways for permit market design.
The problem, however, is that the current literature on US 80-by-50 targets typically assumes banking, so the policy guidance provided by these analyses does not capture the insights about deep decarbonization discussed earlier. Two separate intermodel comparison studies published in 2009 and 2014 investigated policies consistent with these targets. EMF 22 and 24 studies compared results from six and nine (respectively) state-of-the-art models. 6 5 A more thorough discussion of these issues can be found in Section 1.3 of the Supplementary Information. 6 Participating models had different structures and assumptions, and the exercises had slightly different implementation details, as discussed in Clarke et al. (2014) for EMF22 and Kyle et al. (2009) These comparison exercises are especially valuable for identifying robust insights and for understanding areas of disagreement that require further interpretation. However, all scenarios in these comparisons assume unlimited temporal flexibility (and employ significant levels of banking, as shown in Fig. 6b ) and do not include sensitivity analyses to assess the impacts of restricted banking. Figure 6a compares 2050 allowance prices from the EMF studies (which assume unlimited banking and borrowing) and US-REGEN results with banking (dotted line) and without (solid line). Although there is model-specific variation, the 2050 shadow price is generally below $500/t-CO 2 eq except for the FARM model, which is the only participating model that does not incorporate banking. US-REGEN credit prices are consistent with this range. However, allowance prices are significantly higher without banking. No sensitivity analysis without temporal flexibility was conducted in the EMF studies, so it is difficult to compare whether US-REGEN's costs are higher or lower than other models. It is also inherently difficult to elicit costs for technologies many decades out, which is especially true for sectors in the steepest portion of the marginal-abatementcost curve where the available literature is comparably less developed and near-term decisions may impact technological cost and availability.
7 Likewise, 2050 emissions are generally much higher than the 80% cap (Fig. 6b) .
A major takeaway from the experiments in earlier sections of this paper is that policy costs and emission outcomes are heavily dependent on the assumed banking behavior. Given how previous modeling exercises assume unlimited temporal flexibility, ambitious abatement pathways may entail more long-run ambition than current assessments suggest. This discrepancy has important consequences for near-term R&D prioritization, as the magnitude of the energy challenge and scale of technological advances may be underestimated in the literature given its assumed reliance on banking. While policy flexibility can be a partial hedge against unanticipated outcomes, a limited portfolio will increase compliance costs (as shown in the BECCS sensitivity in Fig. 6a) , and the legacy of near-term decisions has important implications for the cost and feasibility of longer-term targets. The results underscore the importance of creating real options through capital formation, market development, and R&D to avoid foreclosing alternatives in decarbonization efforts prematurely. Having a full technological portfolio and avoiding the overreliance on a single technology will lower cost risk, especially in an environment with unanticipated constraints on flexible response.
The role of temporal flexibility in existing climate policy recommendations has been ignored or underappreciated in recent years. Banking's attractiveness on economic efficiency grounds (i.e., reducing compliance costs up to 30%) mask other problematic features, which has led to less informative scenario designs. Although temporal flexibility enhances economic and environmental impacts of climate policy, the current landscape does not seem oriented toward this outcome. In this light, it is problematic that analyses of long-term goals almost exclusively assume that the flexible route will be pursued.
Future analysis should place a greater emphasis on deep decarbonization scenarios without banking for two reasons. First, policy-makers and the public should form expectations of regulatory benefits and costs based on realistic estimates of policy implementation. Relying on inadvertently optimistic scenarios may underestimate the magnitude of the challenge ahead, and limiting the rate and extent of adverse welfare impacts will be critical to the political sustainability of pursuing deep decarbonization pathways. Analyses like the one above may create self-defeating prophecies of high expected prices by mobilizing R&D investments to ensure that solutions will be deployed when needed without disruption. This dynamic of policy-induced innovation (and complementary approaches to tackling innovation externalities) is diminished in a banking setting, which places greater emphasis on front-loading abatement to avoid later efforts.
A second reason to investigate scenarios without banking is that, from a modeling standpoint, these scenarios highlight shortcomings in existing model and analysis frameworks. Very stringent emission targets take many models away from their domains of calibration, since many are not designed to assess non-incremental system changes (Tavoni and Tol 2010) . Model intercomparison exercises stretch model capabilities and provide valuable opportunities to bring researchers together to take stock of strengths and limitations of existing tools. These forums are important for prioritizing poorly understood sectors, technologies, and interactions moving forward and for identifying areas where greater interdisciplinary collaboration is required to capture interactions between complex systems.
